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Visual Adaptation to a Remapped 
Spectrum
Lessons for Enactive Theories of Color Perception and Constancy, the 
Effect of Color on Aesthetic Judgments, and the Memory Color Effect
Rick Grush, Liberty Jaswal, Justin Knoepfler & Amanda Brovold
Many forms of visual adaptation have been studied, including spatial displace-
ments (Heuer &  Hegele 2008), spatial inversions and rotations (Heuer &  Rapp
2011), removing or enhancing various colors in the visual spectrum (Belmore &
Shevell 2011;  Kohler 1963),  and even luminance inversion  (Anstis 1992).  But
there have been no studies that have assessed adaptation to an inverted spectrum,
or more generally color rotation. We present the results of an adaptation protocol
on two subjects who wore LCD goggles that were driven by a video camera, but
such that the visual scene presented to subjects was color-rotated by 120°, so
that blue objects appeared green, green objects appeared red, and red objects ap-
peared blue (with non-primary colors being analogously remapped). One subject
wore the apparatus  intermittently  for  several  hours  per  day  for  a  week.  The
second subject wore the apparatus continually for six days, meaning that all his
visual input for those six days was color rotated. Several experiments were run to
assess the kinds and degrees of adaptation, including Stroop (1935), the memory
color effect (Hansen et al. 2006), and aesthetic judgments of food and people.
Several additional phenomena were assessed and noticed, especially with respect
to color constancy and phenomenal adaptation. The results were that color con-
stancy initially was not present when colors were rotated, but both subjects adap-
ted so that color constancy returned. However, there was no evidence of phenom-
enal color adaptation. Tomatoes continued to look blue, subjects did not adapt so
that they started to look red again. We found no reliable Stroop result. But there
was an adaptation to the memory color effect. Also, interesting differences were
revealed in the way color affects aesthetic judgments of food versus people, and
differences in adaptation to those effects.
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1 Introduction
The idea of a subject whose visual experience is
color inverted has been a philosophical mainstay
at least since  Locke (1975), and has fuelled a
great deal of philosophical work on the nature
of perception up to the present day. In psycho-
logy, testing the extent to which subjects’ visual
systems can adapt to alterations in visual input
has likewise been a fruitful mainstay for over a
century (for current research and references see
Heuer & Hegele 2008; Heuer & Rapp 2011; Bel-
more & Shevell 2011). Despite these two facts,
adaptation to an inverted spectrum has never
been studied. Given that there is adaptation to
a wide range of distortions to visual input, in-
cluding spatial  manipulations and spectral  fil-
tering,  we  speculated  that  it  was  conceivable
that there might be adaptation, in some form or
other, to color rotation. That is, if visual input
was  reworked  such  that  tomatoes  appeared
blue, would subjects over time adapt so that to-
matoes regained their normal (red) phenomenal
appearance? And even if such a shocking result
did not occur, might there nevertheless be ad-
aptation  to  other  color-relevant  phenomena,
such as color constancy, aesthetic judgments, or
the memory-color effect?
We tested this as follows. First, rather than
an  inverted  spectrum,  we  employed  a  rotated
spectrum. An inverted spectrum is one in which
one takes  the  usual  red-to-violet  spectrum and
just reverses it to get a mapping from colors to
colors. Red would map to violet, orange to blue,
violet to red, and so on (see figure 1).
For two reasons we chose to systematically
alter color input not with an inverted spectrum,
but with color rotation (see figure  2). In a 120°
degree rotation, greens become reds, reds become
blues, and blues become greens (see figure 3).
One  reason  to  employ  a  rotation  rather
than an inversion is that in a rotation, all colors
map to different colors, whereas in a spectral in-
version, the middle of the spectrum maps to it-
self,  and so not all colors differ. Also, with a
120°  rotation,  primary colors  map to primary
colors, and this was convenient for testing pur-
poses. For instance, we wanted to test semantic
adaptation via a Stroop task, and Stroop is dif-
ficult to test if one is dealing with non-canonical
colors  (since  subjects  pause  to  think of  what
seems to be the best name for the color: “… um,
periwinkle?”).  It  was  important  that  the  text
was colored in a primary color during baseline
testing  (before  subjects’  vision  was  color-
altered), and that it continued to be presented
in a primary color during testing while colors
were altered.
Figure  2:  Color rotation. If colors on the left disk are
mapped to  colors  that  are  1/3 of  a clockwise  rotation
(120º), then green (lower left) maps on to red (slightly
left of the top); red maps to blue (middle right); and so
forth. The disk on the right is a 120º color-rotated ver-
sion of the disk on the left.
The rotation was implemented in the fol-
lowing way. A small video camera was mounted
on a bike helmet, as were a pair of LCD goggles
(see  figure  4).  The  sides  of  the  goggles  were
sealed against the wearer’s  face so that there
was no peripheral visual input; subjects could
only see what was displayed on the LCDs. The
video camera output was run to a laptop com-
puter, which ran software that color-rotated the
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Figure 1: An inverted spectrum. The familiar red-to-vi-
olet spectrum laid out from left to right (top) compared
to an inverted violet-to-red spectrum from left to right
(bottom). Note that the central colors map to themselves
or very similar colors.
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video feed and pushed the result to the LCD
goggles. The subject would wear the bike hel-
met and carry a bag that held the laptop and
battery  packs  for  the  laptop,  camera,  and
goggles. In what follows we will refer to this as
the rotation gear, or simply the gear. Moreover,
we  will  use  the  expression  under  rotation to
refer to the condition of having one’s visual in-
put color-rotated by the gear. In addition to ro-
tating the spectrum (the intentional effect), the
gear  also  eliminated  binocular  disparity  since
there was only one camera (which projected the
same image to both eyes),  and also  impaired
peripheral  vision,  since  the  camera’s  field  of
view was less than normal vision. As a result,
while  most  normal  activities  were  possible  (if
cumbersome),  some,  such  as  driving  a  motor
vehicle, were not possible.
Figure 3: A typical outdoor scene color-rotated by 120º.
(http://www.open-mind.net/videomaterials/grush-color-video)
There  were  only  two subjects,  and both
were investigators in this project (and authors
of this paper). This was for practical reasons.
First,  we anticipated that UCSD Internal Re-
view Board would be reluctant to grant human
subjects approval, based both on the length and
significant  inconvenience  of  the  protocol  and
also because this particular protocol had never
been  attempted  before,  and  so,  for  example,
there was no precedent concerning whether such
a  regimen  might  cause  long-term  damage  to
participants’ color vision. And even if approval
were obtained, we anticipated that finding vo-
lunteers for such a protocol would be difficult,
and, even if we did find them, the small grant
we were operating with did not give us the re-
sources to appropriately compensate them. Em-
ploying  two  of  the  investigators  as  subjects
solved  these  problems.  Because  investigators
were aware of the protocol and risks, and were
intimately familiar with the relevant equipment
and potential problems and so in a position to
more accurately assess conditions under which
the  protocol  should  be  aborted,  some  of  the
concerns were eased, and approval was eventu-
ally granted. Moreover, investigators were will-
ing to put themselves through the arduous pro-
tocol.
Subject  1  (RG)  wore  the  gear  intermit-
tently, in several multi-hour sessions per day for
a week. Two reasons for an initial intermittent
protocol were, first, that it would allow us to
trouble-shoot  the  equipment—if  it  had  to  be
shut  down for  a  few  hours  for  tinkering  this
would not interfere with the protocol, and we
wanted to ensure that everything was function-
ing  smoothly  before  subject  JK’s  continuous
protocol  began.  And,  second,  we  wanted  to
compare the results of a subject who wore the
gear intermittently with the results of one who
wore it continually. Subject JK wore the gear
continually for six straight days, meaning that
he had no unrotated visual input for that entire
period. He slept with a blindfold and showered
with closed eyes in the dark, but otherwise wore
the gear at all times.
Figure 4: The camera and goggles used.
Our high-level  goals  were  to  assess  phe-
nomenal and semantic adaptation. Phenomenal
adaptation would manifest as a return to nor-
malcy such that under rotation tomatoes would
start to look red again, the sky would appear
blue, and so forth (this is discussed in more de-
tail later on). It might also manifest as a gain-
ing  of  color  constancy  under  rotation.  These
would be parallel to adaptation to spatial inver-
sion in which, after adaptation objects begin to
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look  right-side-up  again.  We  assessed  this  in
several ways. One was the memory-color effect.
A  second  was  aesthetic  judgments.  A  final
method was subjective report: subject JK kept
a hard-copy journal in which he wrote observa-
tions, and RG had a digital voice recorder that
he used for similar  purposes.  There were also
audio recordings made during the testing peri-
ods, as well as when JK finally removed the ro-
tation-gear.
Semantic  adaptation  would  manifest  as  a
remapping of color terms to their “correct” refer-
ents. So, for example, when first putting on the
gear, if a subject were asked to pick up the “blue
block,” they would pick up a block that was in
fact red. Would subjects semantically adapt such
that the word “red” was immediately semantically
connected to the red block, despite the fact that
the block was presented as blue through the rota-
tion gear? This was assessed via subjective report
and Stroop. In the following sections we discuss
each  investigated  phenomenon,  the  results  we
found, and their implications. 
For all experiments there were four times at
which trials were run: i) pre-rotation, in which tri-
als were run after the subject initially put on the
gear but the colors were not yet rotated; ii) early
rotation, wearing the gear and first color-rotating
visual input; iii)  late rotation, at the end of the
time during which the subject was wearing the
gear and had time to adapt; and iv) post-rotation,
while the subject was still wearing the gear, but
colors were not rotated. The reason for running
trials (i) and (iv) while wearing the gear without
rotating the colors, rather than just through nor-
mal vision without the gear, was to control for ef-
fects possibly due only to the fact that visual in-
put  was  going  through  a  camera  and  LCD
goggles. For some experiments there were addi-
tional times at which the trials were run, as will
be explained below.
A final note on methodology. A number of
factors distinguish the current study from an ap-
propriately run and controlled psychological ex-
periment.  The small  n and the fact that both
subjects were also investigators in the study are
perhaps  the  two  most  significant  differences.
These  limitations  were  forced  by  a  variety  of
factors, including the unusual degree of hardship
faced by subjects, our relatively small budget, and
the fact that this protocol had never been tried
before. Because of these limitations, the experi-
ments and results we report here are intended to
be taken only as  preliminary results—as some-
thing like a pilot study. Even so, the results, we
believe, are quite interesting and suggestive.
2 Color, color constancy, and enactive 
vision
According to proponents of enactive perception,
perceptual experience amounts to relevant beha-
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Figure  5:  Images of people and food, in normal color,
and with a 120º color rotation, for purposes of illustration
only—none of these was in the stimuli set used in the ex-
periment. The food items are French toast with maple
syrup and strawberry confit  (middle  row),  and chicken
salad with guacamole (bottom).
www.open-mind.net
vioral skills (O’Regan &  Noë 2001;  Noë 2004,
this collection). 
To be a perceiver is to understand, impli-
citly, the effects of movement on sensory
stimulation  […].  An  object  looms  larger
in the visual field as we approach it, and
its profile deforms as we move about it.
A sound grows louder as we move nearer
to  its  source.  Movements  of  the  hand
over the surface of an object give rise to
shifting sensations. As perceivers we are
masters  of  the  sort  of  sensory  depend-
ence  […].  We  spontaneously  crane  our
necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses,
or draw near to get a better look (or bet-
ter handle,  sniff,  lick, or listen to what
interests us). The central claim of what I
call  the  enactive  approach  is  that  our
ability to perceive not only depends on,
but  is  constituted by,  our possession of
this sort of sensorimotor knowledge. (Noë
2004, pp. 1–2)
The enactive  approach correctly  predicts  that
there will be adaptation to certain kinds of spa-
tial distortion to visual input (Noë 2004). The
idea is that if perception is a matter of learning
sensorimotor  contingencies,  then  though  these
contingencies can be disrupted via altering the
spatial features of the input, the new contingen-
cies can be learned (they are just a different set
of contingencies, after all) and when this hap-
pens, perceptual input will seem normal again.
Noë (2004)  boldly  claims  that  not  just
spatial features, but even color phenomenology
might be explained on enactive principles. 
Our ability to perceive [a] wall’s color de-
pends on our implicit understanding of the
ways its apparent color varies as color-crit-
ical conditions vary. At ground, our grasp
of these dependencies is a kind of sensor-
imotor knowledge. We can distinguish two
different kinds of sensorimotor dependen-
cies […]. Crucially, the perceptual experi-
ence  of  color  depends  on  the  perceiver’s
knowledge  of  both kinds of  sensorimotor
patterns.
Movement-dependent sensorimotor contin-
gencies  are  patterns  of  dependence
between  sensory  stimulation,  on  the  one
hand, and movements of the body, on the
other […].
[O]bject-dependent  […]  sensorimotor  con-
tingencies […] are patterns of dependence
between sensory stimulation and the ob-
ject’s movement, or the object’s changing
relation to its environment. (Noë 2004, pp.
129–130)
Accordingly, our protocol speaks as directly to
the enactive account of color as inverting prisms
speak to an enactive account of vision’s spatial-
ity. Notice that the technological apparatus of
color rotation comes into play  after both sorts
of patterns have manifested (with the exception
of eye movements, which happen after the rota-
tion  is  effected,  though  this  fact  does  not
change any of the contingency patterns). What
this means is this: suppose that there is a par-
ticular way that a red surface changes its re-
flectance properties both as we move around it
(movement-dependent),  and also as it changes
relevantly with respect to the environment (ob-
ject-dependent).  Call  this  pattern  of  changes
Pattern R. And suppose that the same is true
for a blue surface, meaning that it has a differ-
ent,  but  characteristic  pattern  of  changes  we
can call Pattern B. To get a specific example,
let’s suppose that the red surface gets brighter
when it gets angled upwards, but the blue sur-
face  does  not  (the  details  of  these  patterns
don’t  matter  for  purposes  of  illustration,  all
that  matters  is  that  there  are  such  patterns,
and  that  they  differ  for  different  colors).
Whatever the patterns R and B are, they occur
whether anyone is wearing rotation gear or not.
But after the rotation gear is involved the sur-
face  that  is  behaving  according  to  Pattern  R
will be presented to the subject with stimula-
tion from the blue part of the spectrum, and
the surface that is behaving according to Pat-
tern B will be presented with stimulation from
the green part of  the spectrum. For instance,
the subject will see the  apparently blue surface
getting brighter as it is angled upwards, which
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is Pattern R, because the apparently blue sur-
face is actually red, and hence behaves accord-
ing to Pattern R. 
So the question is:  after  experience with
red surfaces, which behave according to object-
ive patterns appropriate to red surfaces  (Pat-
tern R), but are presented through the goggles
with blue parts of the spectrum, will these sur-
faces start to look red again? This is clearly the
prediction that is made by the enactive theory
of color, since to appear red just is to behave
according to Pattern R on this theory, and the
surfaces  that  are  being  presented  with  light
from the blue parts of the spectrum are behav-
ing according to Pattern R. The enactive theory
makes this prediction for both color constancy
and color phenomenology. We will discuss color
constancy first.
We  did  not  test  color  constancy  in  any
controlled way,  but  the subjective  reports  are
quite  unmistakable.  Subject  RG  noticed  that
upon first wearing the rotation gear color con-
stancy went “out the window.” To take one ex-
ample, in normal conditions RG’s office during
the day is brightly lit enough that turning on
the fluorescent light makes no noticeable differ-
ence to the appearance of anything in the office.
But  when  he  turned  the  lights  on  after  first
donning the gear, everything had an immediate
significant  change  of  hue  (though  not  bright-
ness).  He  spent  several  minutes  flipping  the
light  on  and  off  in  amazement.  Another  ex-
ample is that he also noticed that when holding
a colored wooden block,  the surfaces  changed
their  apparent  color  quite  noticeably  as  he
moved it and rotated it, as if the surfaces were
actively  altering  their  color  like  a  chameleon.
This was also a source of prolonged amusement.
However,  after  a  few  days  the  effect  disap-
peared. Turning the office light on had little no-
ticeable effect on the color of anything in his of-
fice, and the surfaces of objects resumed their
usual  boring  constancy  as  illumination  condi-
tions or angles altered.
Subject  JK reported the  same thing:  an
initial  period in  which the apparent  colors  of
objects shifted widely with changes in illumina-
tion conditions or viewing angles, followed after
a day or two with the restoration of color con-
stancy such that those same changes had no ef-
fect on apparent color.
There was one difference, though, between
RG  and  JK.  While  RG’s  perceptual  system
gained the capacity for color  constancy under
rotation, he never lost color constancy in nor-
mal conditions. After the first few days of inter-
mittently wearing the gear, objects had stable
apparent  colors  whether  he  wore  the  gear  or
not.  Though  of  course  the  colors  that  were
stable were different in the two conditions. JK
(who wore the gear continuously for six days)
also gained color constancy under rotation, but
lost it for normal conditions, as was apparent at
the end of his trial when he removed the gear.
Indeed,  almost  immediately  after  he  removed
the gear and was seeing things without rotation
for the first time in six days, he spent several
minutes flipping a light switch on and off and
marvelling as the apparent color of everything
in the room changed at his command (while no
one else in the room noticed anything). So while
RG’s visual system became, so to speak, bi-con-
stant,  because  he  switched  back  and  forth
between rotated and non-rotated visual input,
JK’s visual system, because it was exclusively
rotated for six days, gained color constancy un-
der rotation, but temporarily lost normal color
constancy.  Normal  constancy  returned  for  JK
within a few hours after he stopped wearing the
gear.
These results are precisely what the enact-
ive theory of color constancy would predict. Ini-
tially  the  kinds  of  patterns  of  color-relevant
change exhibited by objects in the environment
was different from what the visual system had
come to expect, both in terms of changes in en-
vironmental conditions generally (e.g., switching
on a fluorescent light), and movement specific
changes (e.g., walking around them or rotating
them in hand). The sensorimotor contingencies
changed,  and as a result  color  constancy was
disrupted.  But  after  a  period  of  time  during
which  these  new  dependencies  were,  presum-
ably, learned, color constancy was restored.
A more convincing protocol would be one
in  which  there  were  control  subjects  whose
visual input was rotated, but who were not act-
ive in their color environment. Such a protocol
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would be difficult to implement. Wearing rotat-
ing equipment for six days is quite difficult. If
you were then to disconnect visual input from
overt behavior on top of that,  this would be-
come extremely  burdensome for  test  subjects.
This could be done either by having the video
camera not moving at all, or moving randomly;
or by recording the video from a rotated subject
as  they  are  actively  exploring  their  environ-
ment, and simply play that video back to con-
trol subjects, so that their visual input would
not change at all as a consequence of their own
actions. But even though there was no control
of this sort in our protocol, it is safe to say that
the  proponent  of  an  enactive  theory  of  color
constancy should be encouraged by this result.
But what about color adaptation? Did red
surfaces  start  to  look  red  again?  The  results
here are less encouraging for the enactive theor-
ist. With one interesting and suggestive obser-
vation to be discussed shortly, we found nothing
that suggested color adaptation. As assessed by
subjective  report,  stop  signs  continued to ap-
pear  blue,  the  sky  green,  and  broccoli  red
throughout for both subjects.
Though this is not the result that the en-
active theorist would hope for, it isn’t entirely
conclusive. First, it may have been the case that
a protocol of longer than six days would have
resulted  in  phenomenal  adaptation.  Six  days
may simply not have been long enough to learn
the  new  relevant  sensorimotor  contingencies.
This  is  certainly  possible.  But  it  should  be
noted that all other sorts of visual adaptation
(to spatial inversions, spectral filtering etc.), in-
cluding our own result with adaptation to color
constancy, occurred in less than six days. 
Second, the gear does in fact introduce a
lot  of  artefacts  besides  just  the  change  in
presented  colors.  Artefacts  are  introduced  by
the digitization of the image and its presenta-
tion through LCD goggles. So proponents of the
enactive  theory  of  color  needn’t  jump  off  a
building just yet. They may maintain that be-
cause of these artefacts, the process of relearn-
ing the needed sensorimotor contingencies was
somehow short-circuited. 
But there are a couple of  considerations
that suggest that the result is not so easily dis-
missed.  First,  whatever  artefacts  the gear  did
introduce were not such as to make any differ-
ence to normal color  vision.  If  one wears the
gear without color-rotation, things appear to be
in their  normal colors.  This  seems to suggest
that  whatever  patterns  of  change  account  for
our ability to see normal things in their normal
colors,  they are not  significantly compromised
by whatever artefacts the gear introduced. This
would seem to remove some of the motivation
from the suggestion that adaptation did not oc-
cur because of artefacts introduced by the gear.
Second, the gear clearly maintained enough in-
formation about patterns of color change that
adaptation  to  color  constancy  occurred  fairly
quickly. Again, this suggests that much or all of
whatever is important in patterns of change rel-
evant  to  color  perception  is  preserved  by the
gear.  If  it  was  not,  adaptation  to  color  con-
stancy should not have occurred. The one thing
not preserved by the rotation gear was the sen-
sorimotor-independent feature  of  which  retinal
cells were stimulated when various surfaces were
in view. And that one feature seems to be the
best candidate for the determinant of apparent
color,  given  that  everything  else  changed but
apparent color did not. 
We mentioned above that there was an in-
teresting  pair  of  events  that,  while  not  quite
amounting  to  phenomenal  adaptation,  are  at
least very suggestive. On two occasions late into
his six-day period of wearing the gear, JK went
into a  sudden panic  because  he thought  that
the rotation equipment was malfunctioning and
no longer rotating his visual input. Both times,
as he reports it, he suddenly had the impression
that  everything  was  looking  normal.  This
caused panic because if there was a glitch caus-
ing the equipment to no longer rotate his visual
input, then the experimental protocol would be
compromised, and the value of his days of sacri-
fice  in  the  name  of  science  and  philosophy
would have been significantly diminished.
However, the equipment was not malfunc-
tioning on either occasion, a fact of which JK
quickly convinced himself both times by expli-
citly reflecting on the colors that objects, spe-
cifically his hands, appeared to have: “OK, my
hand  looks  purplish,  and  purple  is  what  it
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should like under rotation, so the equipment is
still working correctly.”
Prima facie there seems to be a clear differ-
ence between i) a tomato looking “normal” be-
cause it now appears phenomenally to be red; and
ii) a tomato looking “normal” because though it
appears blue, one is now used to tomatoes ap-
pearing blue, that is, blue no longer appears un-
usual. JK’s situation was a case of (ii), but the
lack of a sense of novelty of strangeness made him
briefly fear that he was in a (i) situation. He de-
scribed it as a cessation of a “this is weird” signal.
Even though (i) and (ii) seem to be quite
different, the phenomenon is suggestive. It in-
dicates that there is definitely a stage in which
the subject requires explicit reflection to discern
(i) from (ii). This might lead one to speculate
that this stage might signal an early stage of
genuine  color  adaptation (we will  discuss  this
further in the final section).
But it could also be an initial stage of a
very different possibility, one discussed by  Noë
himself:
[…] the strongest [inverted spectrum] argu-
ments ask us to consider the possibility in
the first person. At stage 1 I am inverted.
At stage 2, I get used to the inversion. I
realize things now look color-inverted com-
pared to the way they used to look, and I
use this knowledge to guide my correct use
of words. I get really good at acting nor-
mal. At stage 3, I suffer amnesia and for-
get that things ever looked different. The
point of this thought experiment is that it
suggests a reason to believe that things are
now different with me with respect to my
color  experience,  even  though I  am now
unable to report those differences. (2004,
p. 94)
While JK never suffered from amnesia, his two
episodes suggest that it is possible to at least go
some distance down precisely this path. 
3 The memory-color effect
If subjects are given control over the hue of an
image and asked to adjust it  until  it  appears
grey scale there is an interesting effect. If the
image is of an object with a salient prototypical
color (such as bananas, which are saliently and
prototypically yellow), subjects will judge that
it is grey scale when in fact the hue is slightly
in the direction opposite to that of the standard
color.  So, for example, an image of  a banana
will be judged to be grey scale when it is in fact
just  slightly  periwinkle.  This  is  the  memory-
color effect (Hansen et al. 2006). One possible
explanation of this effect is that when the image
actually  is  grey  scale,  subjects’  top-down  ex-
pectations about the usual color make it appear
(in some way or another) to be slightly tinted in
that hue. So when the image of the banana is
actually completely grey scale subjects judge it
to be slightly yellow. The actual color of the im-
age must be slightly in the direction opposite
yellow (periwinkle) in order to cancel this top-
down effect and make the image appear grey.
This is the memory-color effect.
We expected that after a period of wearing
the gear this effect would diminish or even re-
verse. The reasoning was that if the rotated ex-
perience either just disrupted the association of
the  objects  with  their  prototypical  color,  or
even established a different prototypical color,
the effect would be compromised.
Stimuli used in our trials were images of a
banana,  tomatoes,  broccoli,  a  fire  engine,  a
school bus, a stop sign, and a Starbucks logo.
We wanted examples of natural objects as well
as artefacts with strong color associations. We
also used squares and circles, which have no ob-
vious prototypical color, as controls. The hue of
the initial image presentation was random, and
subjects were to adjust the hue until the image
appeared completely grey scale. 
There were technical issues with RG that
prevented his data from being usable. But sub-
ject JK’s results were in fact what we expected.
Pre-rotation,  JK’s  results  were  normal.  He
judged the stimuli to be grey when in fact they
were, on average, 3.5% saturated in the direc-
tion of the opponent color. JK was quite con-
sistent with this except for one stimulus condi-
tion, broccoli,  which he actually exhibited the
opposite of the expected pattern. He judged it
to be grey when it was about 1% saturated in
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its normal color. The effect was robust, and we
have no idea why. We suspect that it was some
sort of artefact connected to that stimulus being
presented  through  the  rotation  gear,  but  we
don’t know for sure.
Post-adaptation JK’s assessments were, on
average,  about  0.5%  saturation,  again  in  the
direction of the opponent color. Meaning that
he still exhibited the effect, but its magnitude
was  lessened.  This  could  mean  one  of  two
things:  i)  the  rotation  protocol  disrupted  the
usual associations of colors and objects, and so
all stimuli ended up being treated by his per-
ceptual system just as controls, that is, as ob-
jects with no salient associated color; and ii) JK
partially  adapted to objects’  new prototypical
colors.  Unfortunately  the  result  we  got,  in
which assessments were on average very close to
grey, is consistent with both. The alteration was
consistent with both a movement towards grey
and a movement towards  the canonical  color,
since both are in the same direction from a spot
opposite the canonical color. But one considera-
tion that speaks in favor of (ii) is that the broc-
coli stimuli, post-adaptation, did not move to-
wards grey, but in fact were judged to be grey
when they were even more green than in the
pre-rotation trial. That is, the broccoli stimuli
judgments moved not in the direction of grey,
but in the direction of canonical color, and by
about  the  same  amount  as  the  other  stimuli
moved in that direction: 2.5%. 
Our result in the memory-color effect and
the  two  occasions  in  which  JK  panicked  are
consistent.  Both  effects  would  seem  to  result
from  a  re-aligning  of  the  salient  prototypical
color of objects that have a salient prototypical
color. The adaptation of the memory-color ef-
fect suggests that the experience of being color-
rotated lessened the extent to which top-down
effects associated certain objects with their ac-
tual prototypical colors, and perhaps even star-
ted associating them with new, different proto-
typical  colors.  And  the  lack  of  the  “this  is
weird” signal when viewing his purple hand also
suggests  that  the old prototypical  look of  his
hand was being supplanted with a new proto-
typical look. And it also suggests not just that
the old prototypical color association was being
lessened,  but  that  a  new  one  was  emerging.
What failed to look weird was his  purple hand
—not just a hand in any non-flesh color, but in
purple. We did not test this, but it seems quite
unlikely  that  had  his  hand  suddenly  looked
bright red he would have similarly experienced
a loss of the “this is weird” signal. This is spec-
ulative,  but  it  at  least  suggests,  consistently
with  the  broccoli  effect  discussed  above,  that
the result we saw with the memory-color effect
was not just a loosening of the old associations,
but the emergence of new ones.
Moreover, the adaptation of the memory-
color effect appears to have been  general. The
items we used for testing in the memory color
effect fell into two groups: first, there were those
items,  such  as  Starbucks  logos  and  bananas,
which were such that items of that type were
observed at least sometimes during the period
of rotation; and second there were others, such
as fire trucks and baby chicks, which were not
observed by the subject under rotation. If what
was  being  altered  by  rotated  experience  was
just the specific associations of colors with ex-
perienced objects,  then we should have found
different results for these two groups of objects.
Bananas and Starbucks logos would be subject
to adaptation with respect to the memory-color
effect,  and fire  trucks  and baby chicks  would
not. But this is not what we found. We found
the  memory-color  effect  was  impacted  for  all
tested  objects,  even  those  that  had  not  been
seen during rotation. 
This  suggests  that  the  effect  was  general,
meaning that the adaptation was manifested not as
an alteration in some part of the perceptual system
concerning its expectations about what bananas or
other specific objects look like. Rather, the altera-
tion appears to have concerned expectation about
what yellow things generally look like. To put it in
dangerously  loose  and  anthropomorphic  terms,
some part of the system started cranking up the
periwinkle knob when objects known to be yellow,
like  baby  chicks,  were  seen.  If  this  is  indeed  a
memory effect (psychologist do, for some reason,
call  it  the  memory-color effect),  then it suggests
that  some  part  of  the  system  knew  that  baby
chicks were supposed to be yellow, but was begin-
ning to misremember what yellow was like.
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Recall where we left off in the last section.
There was a suggestion to the effect that for a
subject  who  underwent  an  inverted  spectrum
procedure, a cessation of the “this is weird” sig-
nal,  together  with  a  loss  of  memory  of  how
things used to look might result  in that sub-
ject’s  inability  to  report  differences  between
their current inverted experience and their prior
non-inverted experience. Such a subject would
of course verbally report that their phenomeno-
logy had adapted (or, if they were more reflect-
ive, they might also admit the possibility that
their phenomenology was still inverted, but that
their memory was failing to make this fact ap-
parent to them). To indulge in some wild specu-
lation, the general nature of the adaptation to
the  memory-color  experiment  suggests  that
something along these lines might possibly hap-
pen if there was a longer adaptation period. We
will return to this in the final section.
4 Aesthetic judgments
Color plays a large role in a variety of aesthetic
judgments.  Red  broccoli  doesn’t  look  terribly
appealing as a food item, and Hollywood main-
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Table 1: Assessments of food appeal. The graphs show the average scores for both subjects. For each subject, before
testing each subject scored all images on a scale of 1–10, 10 being the most appealing. These scores were used to estab -
lish a normalization for each subject so that all scores could be re-expressed in terms of . They were also used to diσ -
vide the dishes into high-rated and low-rated groups for each subject. Each subject then re-assessed each dish at four
times during the experiment: pre-rotation, early-rotation, late-rotation, and post-rotation (see text for explanation). As
can be seen, upon color rotation all dishes plummeted in their perceived appeal to a level below the score the unappeal -
ing dishes had before rotation. But after adaptation (late rotation) the low-rated dishes regained all of their appeal,
and the high-rated ones regained a moderate amount.
www.open-mind.net
tains  that  gentlemen  prefer  blondes.  But  to
what extent are these judgments malleable with
experience? Might the red broccoli start to look
more appetizing if  one has enough experience
eating it? To assess these questions we ran two
aesthetic  judgment  experiments.  In  one,  we
measured how appealing different dishes looked,
and in another we measured judgments of phys-
ical attractiveness of people (figure  5). For the
first  we  used  images  from a  large  cook-book
with a wide variety of dishes. For the second,
since both subjects were heterosexual males, we
used pictures of adult women taken from the in-
ternet. In both cases we separated the stimuli
into high-rated and low-rated groups so that we
could assess whether color rotation had a differ-
ential effect. And in both cases we ran four tri-
als: an unrotated baseline trial of judgments be-
fore beginning the rotation period; an early-ro-
tation trial immediately upon wearing the rota-
tion gear; a late-rotation trial at the end of the
adaptation  period;  and finally  a  post-rotation
trial normal color vision was restored. Subjects
scored all stimuli with a 1–10 numerical rating.
We used the normal vision early-rotation rat-
ings of  each subject both to sort stimuli  into
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Table 2: Assessments of physical attractiveness of people. The graphs show the average scores for both subjects. For
each subject, before testing each subject scored all images on a scale of 1–10, 10 being the most attractive. These scores
were used to establish a normalization for each subject so that all scores could be re-expressed in terms of . They wereσ
also used to divide the images into high-rated and low-rated groups for each subject. Each subject then re-assessed each
image at four times during the experiment: pre-rotation, early-rotation, late-rotation, and post-rotation (see text for ex-
planation). As can be seen, color rotation had much less effect on ratings of physical attractiveness of people than it did
on the appeal of food. The low-rated group was essentially unchanged throughout the protocol. The high-rated group
experienced a relatively small drop during early-rotation, but regained nearly all of it by late rotation.
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subject-specific  high-rated  and  low-rated
groups, and to establish a normalization (aver-
age and standard deviation) so that we could
translate all ratings provided by each subject in
terms of , meaning that 0 was average, 1 wasσ
one standard deviation above average, –1 was
one standard deviation below average,  and so
forth.
The  results  can  be  summarized  quickly
(see table 1). For dishes in the appealing group,
their appeal ratings immediately dropped signi-
ficantly from pre-rotation to early-rotation. The
drop was, on average, 3 ,  from an average ofσ
1.06  to an average of –2.06 ! Some notes fromσ σ
JK’s diary speak to the effect of color rotation
on food appeal:
Spinach looks a glossy, poisonous red (it’s
the texture and the color that look really
nasty together, I think).
I genuinely lost my appetite at the sight of
four enormous bowls of glossy red salad,
pale pink cheese, blue kidney beans, deep
blue beets, bright red peas, etc. […]
I’ve noticed that I don’t anticipate food at
all the way I normally do. Normally dur-
ing  the  day  I  think  about  food,  think
about  making  food,  think  about  eating
food, and when I get a full plate of tasty
looking  food  in  front  of  me,  I’m a  very
happy person. Now there’s a real discon-
nect between the way food tastes and the
way it looks, and I don’t honestly find my-
self craving anything during the day. I get
hungry,  yes,  but  a  full  plate  of  food  in
front of me looks intensely neutral on the
desirability scale.
At the end of the adaptation period, those high-
rated dishes had regained half of their appeal,
being judged on average about –0.41 . Both RGσ
and  JK  followed  this  pattern.  Interestingly
though, in the post-rotation rating, RG’s rat-
ings returned to within .35  of baseline for theσ
appealing dishes (to .71  compared to an initialσ
average rating of 1.06 ), while JK’s ratings wereσ
lower,  returning  only  to  within  0.61  ofσ
baseline, from 1.09  to 0.48 . But this is still aσ σ
very significant absolute gain. On average, both
ratings returned to 0.60  post-rotation. Again,σ
from JK’s diary after his return to normal vis-
ion and going to a salad bar:
The  various  greens  were  really  intensely
“green,” the carrots looked like they were
going to leap out of the buffet line. The
onions (red onions) were the only veget-
able that didn’t surprise me with its vivid-
ness. I was horribly hungry; eating was im-
mensely  pleasurable.  You  have  no  idea
how nice it is for food to look and taste
right.
For the less-appealing group of dishes the rat-
ings  also  dropped  immediately  from pre-rota-
tion to early-rotation, on average by .89 , fromσ
–1.23  to –2.12 . This group of dishes recoveredσ σ
to  –1.06  in  late-rotation,  just  slightly  aboveσ
their pre-rotation ratings. In post-rotation this
group of dishes rose to above their baseline rat-
ings, to –0.31 , nearly a full standard deviationσ
above their pre-rotation baseline! 
Interestingly, the overall pattern was that
while the high-rated dishes started at 2 , andσ
low-rated  dishes  started  at  –1 ,  they  allσ
dropped  to  the  same  –2  immediately  uponσ
early-rotation.  The  color  rotation  just  made
everything, dishes that normally looked appeal-
ing as well as those that did not, look very un-
appealing. After adaptation at late-rotation, the
lower-rated  dishes  recovered  all  of  their  per-
ceived  appeal  (low  though  it  was),  and  the
higher-rated  dishes  recovered  half.  But  it  is
worth remarking that the appealing dishes had
a larger absolute gain after adaptation, suggest-
ing that experience with appealing and unap-
pealing  food  did  have  an  effect  on  how each
subject  judged  the  appeal  of  foods  based  on
color. Unappealing dishes returned to their nor-
mal level of unappeal, and the appealing dishes
made significant  gains  towards looking as  ap-
pealing as they had before.
As for the physical  attractiveness  assess-
ments, the effect of color rotation was much less
pronounced than it was in the case of food. We
dubbed this the Star Trek effect (in honor of
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Captain  Kirk’s  romantic  liaisons  with  green
alien women): attractive people are still pretty
attractive whether their skin is blue, or green,
or any other color.
The results are summarized in table 2. As
in the case of food, we did an initial norming
trial, and then separated stimuli into high-scor-
ing and low-scoring groups. And we tested at
the  same  four  times:  pre-rotation,  early-rota-
tion,  late-rotation,  and  post-rotation.  For  the
low-scoring stimuli, there was almost no differ-
ence across the four trials. The average rating in
this group started at –1.49  pre-rotation, andσ
then actually (slightly) improved during early-
rotation to –1.30 . Late-rotation ratings fell toσ
–1.44, and then post-rotation ratings were at –
1.50.  Basically,  color  rotation  had  no  pro-
nounced effect on this group, either before or
after the adaptation period.
For  the  high-scoring  stimuli  the  pattern
was more interesting. Pre-rotation average was
1.07 , which dropped to 0.23  immediately atσ σ
early-rotation. While this is indeed a drop, it is
a  much smaller  drop  than  the  corresponding
condition with food, in which high-rated dishes
dropped  3.00 .  High-rated  people  ratingsσ
dropped only about ¼ as much as high-rated
food  ratings  upon  rotation.  Late-rotation  the
high-scoring  people  had  nearly  completely  re-
bounded  to  0.92 ,  only  0.15  less  than  theirσ σ
pre-rotation  scores.  Post-rotation  the  ratings
dropped  slightly  to  0.77 ,  meaning  that  theσ
people were actually judged to be less attractive
in  their  normal  color,  than  they  were  when
color-rotated,  though  the  degree  of  drop  was
small.
The difference we found between food and
people is consistent with studies involving less ex-
treme color manipulation. It is well known that
color has a very large effect on the appeal of food
(Delwiche 2004; Zampini et al. 2007; Shankar et
al. 2010).  Existing  studies  of  food-color  effects
typically involve less extreme color manipulations
than we studied here, but the results are similar.
With people, though skin color does have an ef-
fect  on  perceived  attractiveness,  structural  fea-
tures (e.g., facial bone structure, symmetry, body
proportions) seem to be more significant (Barber
1995; Dixson et al. 2007).
5 Semantic adaptation
We were keen to investigate the extent to which
there  would  be  semantic  adaptation.  When a
normal  fluent  English  speaker  hears  “red”  as
part of a sentence, a host of cognitive and beha-
vioral states and processes are invoked that are
keyed to a certain phenomenal appearance. If I
ask you to “hand me the red block” you can im-
mediately and without overt reflection grasp the
correct block, even if it is surrounded by other,
differently colored blocks. To what extent would
color-rotated  subjects  show  semantic  adapta-
tion? Would a point be reached at which the
sentence “hand me the red block” just as flu-
ently resulted in the grasp of the block that was
in fact red, but presented as blue?
To  help  facilitate  semantic  adaptation
both subjects spent a good deal of time each
day  performing  tasks  requiring  engagement
with  color  vocabulary.  The  most  relevant  of
which was the building game,  in  which sub-
jects were given written or verbal descriptions
for building constructions from colored blocks.
The constructions  required  blocks  of  specific
colors  to  be  placed  in  specific  locations  and
orientations. Instructions were given in terms
of  the  blocks’  actual  color.  Success  required
that  subjects  select  the  correct  blocks  even
though the color terms used mismatched their
visual input. 
Our main method of testing adaptation in
a detailed way was Stroop (1935). For technical
reasons we have data only for JK (RG’s trail
exposed a problem with the interaction between
the goggles and the computer display presenting
the stimuli, which rendered those data unusable
but  did  allow us  to  fix  the  issue  so  that  we
could collect valid data from JK). In one stand-
ard  Stroop  set-up,  subjects  are  shown  color
words presented in colored text, the text either
spelling out a color  name,  or being a neutral
series of asterisks, such as ****. For example,
subjects might see the word RED in blue text.
The task is to name, as quickly as possible, the
color of the text while ignoring the color named
by the  word.  When presented  with  the  word
RED in blue text, the subject is to say “blue”
as quickly as possible. 
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The standard result is that there is signi-
ficant  interference.  Subjects  are  fastest  and
most accurate when the color of the text and
the color word match, as in the word BLUE in
blue text. When there is a mismatch, they are
slower and commit more errors, especially errors
in which the subject replies with the color word
named by the text,  and not  the color  of  the
text. Our hypothesis was this: with colors ro-
tated by 120° but before a period of adaptation,
subjects would show the same pattern as nor-
mal subjects in that they would have interfer-
ence  when the  color  named by the  text  mis-
matched the rotated color of the text. So for ex-
ample the word RED in red text (which would
be presented as blue through the goggles) would
result  in  interference,  but  the  word  RED  in
green text (which would be presented as red)
would  not.  But  after  wearing  the  gear  for  a
period of time there would be some degree of
semantic  adaptation.  This  would  manifest  in
two ways. First, there should be facilitation, or
at least diminished interference, when the color
named is the same as the actual color of the
text, even though it is presented in a different
color. And second, there should now be interfer-
ence, or less facilitation, when the color named
is the same as the color in which the word is
presented, because that color would be different
to the color the word actually is. 
The results were that we found no signific-
ant effect in either  direction.  This  was disap-
pointing, but it is consistent with the subjective
reports  of  both  RG  and  JK.  They  both  re-
marked that it quickly became easy to do the
appropriate translation and, for instance, grab
the  green  block  when  one  was  instructed  to
“grab the green block” despite its being presen-
ted as red through the goggles. But even near
the end of their adaptation periods, it still felt
like  it  was  an  active  (though  fast  and  easy)
translation,  and  not  a  pre-reflective  semantic
connection  between  “green”  and  the  actually
green objects. 
6 Discussion
All  of  the  experimental  results  reported  here
should be treated as pilot study results. Our n
was very small, either 1 or 2 depending on the
experiment,  and investigators  were  themselves
experimental subjects. Both of these are signi-
ficant limitations.  Nevertheless we’re confident
that any follow-up studies, with larger n, with
more  subjects  who  are  not  investigators,  and
perhaps  with  better  equipment  than  we  had
available  (for  example,  a  camera  with  higher
resolution),  will  yield  results  consistent  with
ours. We hope that any group that chooses to
follow up will have an easier time than we did.
To that end, we can report that post experi-
ment both subjects’ vision returned to normal,
including  color  discrimination  (which  we  as-
sessed a few days post gear),  and so perhaps
with verification in  hand that  the protocol  is
safe, it will be a little easier for others to get
approval for use of human subjects.
The  experiment  as  we have  described  it
was  designed  to  assess,  among  other  things,
phenomenal adaptation. We’ve acted so far as
though what this means is obvious. But we’re
now in a position to see that it isn’t obvious at
all. For anyone who believes in qualia (and Den-
nett 1988 is  right  when  he  says  that  most
people  do,  philosophers  or  scientists,  whether
they realize it or admit it or not), then the idea
would be straightforward. Phenomenal adapta-
tion would occur when, for instance, tomatoes
start causing red qualia again, even if the sub-
ject is wearing the rotation gear. There are al-
ternatives to the qualia theory. The enactive ap-
proach offers one: the idea would be that phe-
nomenal adaptation is nothing but enactive ad-
aptation, that is, learning new sets of sensorimo-
tor (and related) contingencies. Our results, es-
pecially  the  lack of  any straight-forward phe-
nomenal  adaptation,  though far  from decisive
put  at  least  a  little  pressure  on  the  enactive
view, however. Another approach (e.g., Dennett
1988) would be to first cash phenomenology out
in terms of inner discriminatory states that are
tied to various reactive potentials. Described in
this broad way, the enactive approach would be
a  very  special  case.  The  reactive  potentials
would include behavioural dispositions and pos-
sibilities,  and even predictive possibilities,  but
also  aesthetic  reactions,  emotional  reactions,
cognitive  reactions,  and  so  forth.  As  Dennett
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puts  it,  the  mistake  made  by the  believer  in
qualia is the mistaken belief that
[…]  we  can  isolate  the  qualia  from
everything else that is going on—at least
in principle or for the sake of argument.
What counts as the way the juice tastes to
x can be distinguished, one supposes, from
what is a mere accompaniment, contribut-
ory cause, or byproduct of this “central”
way. One dimly imagines taking such cases
and stripping them down gradually to the
essentials, leaving their common residuum,
the  way  things  look,  sound,  feel,  taste,
smell  to  various  individuals  at  various
times,  independently  of  how  those  indi-
viduals are stimulated or non-perceptually
affected,  and  independently  of  how they
are subsequently disposed to behave or be-
lieve. (1988)
On this view, JK (and to a lesser extent RG)
may have been part way down the path to the
only thing that would legitimately count as phe-
nomenal  adaptation,  namely,  changes  in  the
way that  some inner  discriminatory  ability  is
evoked and what its various consequences are.
As we found, aesthetic judgments had started
to adapt, and even the memory-color effect had
begun to adapt in a way that speculatively may
have been a reflection of alterations in what ca-
nonical  colors  were  supposed  to  look  like.
Moreover, JK was losing his “this is weird” sig-
nals. And though we did not find evidence of
semantic adaptation, it would be quite surpris-
ing,  given  humans’  ability  to  learn  new  lan-
guages and dialects,  if  after  a  more  extended
period of time semantic adaptation did not oc-
cur.
Whatever the details, for purposes of this
experiment, we don’t feel compelled to take a
detailed stand on any of this. We would have
been satisfied with subjective report of phenom-
enal  adaptation,  and  then  left  it  to  further
philosophical and even psychological investiga-
tion to unpack what this could mean. Neverthe-
less, the adaptation to color constancy and the
memory-color effect, as well as the loss of the
“this is weird“ signal, are all suggestive results
that we hope will help move debate in the relev-
ant fields forward.
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